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poverty require a solid understanding of underlying poverty dynamics and associated 
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Dynamic Field Experiments in Development Economics: 
Risk Valuation in Morocco, Kenya and Peru 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Recent research in development economics has improved our theoretical conception of 
poverty and empirical methods for measuring it. As one significant improvement, 
economists now pay much greater attention now to dynamic dimensions of poverty and 
vulnerability. This appreciation for asset and poverty dynamics and for the crucial 
intertemporal dimensions of poverty in rural agro-pastoral settings is manifest in both 
theoretical and empirical advances and is starting to influence policy in some settings.  
The effective design and implementation of interventions that reduce vulnerability 
and poverty require a solid understanding of underlying poverty dynamics and associated 
behavioral responses. When introducing insurance products or risk reducing crops, for 
example, understanding how the target beneficiaries assess and value risk in the context of 
these underlying dynamics is critical. Of course, the success of these interventions hinges 
not only on our understanding as researchers of the underlying dynamics and behavioral 
responses but turns critically on how well the target beneficiaries understand the potential 
benefits associated with a new product, policy or technology. Interventions aimed at 
reducing vulnerability often confer benefits that are both stochastic and dynamic, which 
complicate this learning process. To illustrate, the benefits of an insurance product to a 
household depend on the dynamic wealth or asset forces it faces (e.g., its asset position 
relative to a dynamic asset threshold). These benefits are also stochastic since payouts are a 
function of a stochastic outcome such as rainfall. Stochastic and dynamic benefit streams 
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can make it difficult for the poor to learn the value of such an insurance product to them – 
even after they fully understand how the product works.  
Field experiments can help intended beneficiaries learn and understand these 
complicated benefit streams. Moreover, these experiments can help us as researchers better 
understand how the poor respond to risk when faced with nonlinear welfare dynamics. We 
describe in this paper three recent field experiments motivated by these objectives that 
explicitly incorporate dynamic elements and incentives. Each of these experiments is part 
of a separate research effort to reduce the vulnerability of the rural poor. Each is also the 
subject of more detailed ongoing analyses, so our intent in this paper is not to provide a 
comprehensive analysis and comparison of these three experiments. Rather, we focus here 
on how these three experiments introduce dynamic features and how subjects respond to 
these features. For each experiment, we provide some essential details about the larger 
research projects into which they fit, but intentionally stop well short of a complete 
description of the project, the experiment or the broader results.1  
The first project aims to assess the welfare impacts of drought risk among rainfed 
cereal farmers in Morocco and to evaluate farmers’ valuation of drought tolerant cereal 
varieties in this context. As part of this project, a field experiment was designed to simulate 
drought tolerance and elicit farmers’ valuation of this trait. The experiment elicited their 
valuation of drought tolerance without and with land accumulation dynamics, and our 
analysis highlights the effect these dynamics have on subjects’ risk valuation. The second 
and third projects aim to introduce index insurance products among Peruvian farmers and 
Kenyan pastoralists, respectively. The experiments associated with these projects elicit 
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subjects’ valuation of these insurance products and explicitly incorporate dynamic 
incentives. Since these experiments are part of an effort to roll-out new insurance products, 
a primary objective of these experiments is to build comprehension among subjects.  
In the next section, we offer a brief background to experimental development 
economics and to dynamic experiments in economics more broadly. We then describe and 
present the Moroccan field experiment and results related to the dynamic element of this 
experiment. In sections IV and V, we describe and present the field experiments from Peru 
and Kenya, respectively, along with pertinent results. For each field experiment, we 
present analysis of the effect of the dynamic structure on subject behavior. We conclude 
with a comparison and discussion of these three experiments, which we use as a platform 




After Binswanger conducted risk experiments in India (Binswanger 1980), development 
economists did very little follow-on work with experiments for nearly two decades. The 
past decade, however, has seen an explosion of experiments in development economics 
(see Cardenas and Carpenter 2008 for an overview). Most of these recent experiments fit 
into standard categories such as risk, public goods, and social norms related to fairness and 
equality. Others are tailored to topics that are fairly unique to development economics. For 
example, some sophisticated experiments have simulated various lender-borrower and 
borrower-borrower interactions in microfinance arrangements that involve group lending 
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(e.g., Cassar, Crowley and Wydick 2007; Gine et al. 2009). The experimental design 
mindset now permeates nearly every aspect of development economics, including the 
randomized evaluation of programs. Many of these experiments have generated insights 
that could not have come via standard research methods.  
 Several recent field experiments in development economics have build on 
Binswanger’s experimental elicitation of risk preferences. Many of these offer subjects a 
choice of gambles much like Binswanger original design (e.g., Humphrey and Verschoor 
2004a; Wik and Holden 1998). Others elicit certainty equivalents directly through open 
ended bidding for various gambles (e.g., Henrich and McElreath 2002; Lybbert 2006). 
Whereas risk experiments in development economics initially aimed to provide estimates 
of coefficients of risk aversion, the more recent round of risk experiments aim to test 
prospect theory and other alternatives to expected utility theory (e.g., Humphrey and 
Verschoor 2004b), to elicit time and risk preferences jointly (Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen 
forthcoming), or to evaluate risky decision making in specific contexts as implied by 
decisions related to specific risk-related products such as new seed varieties that reduce 
risk by conferring pest or drought tolerance (Lybbert 2006). The experiments we discuss in 
this paper are of the latter ilk and assess risky decision making by offering subjects 
gambles representing new risk-reducing seeds and insurance products that protect them 
from bad covariate shocks.  
  Both in and (mostly) out of development economics, economists have recently 
started designing dynamic experiments in which subjects’ decision problem is linked 
across repeated rounds – often via randomized endowments or cumulative earnings and a 
 6
discrete change in key parameters in the experiment at a known point in endowment or 
earnings space. In developing countries, dynamic designs have appeared in microfinance 
experiments in which default on a loan jeopardizes future credit (Abbink et al. 2006; Gine 
et al. 2009). The dynamic incentive created by the threat of cutting off future credit 
importantly shapes repayment rates. Indeed, judging by experimental evidence, these 
dynamic incentives seem to affect repayment rates more than group lending arrangements 
(Abbink et al. 2006; Gine et al. 2009). More relevant for our purposes, Gine et al. (2009) 
use their experimental data from individual loans without dynamic incentives to categorize 
individuals into three (static) risk aversion types, then condition individuals’ subsequent 
response to dynamic incentives on this indicator of static risk aversion. They find that the 
risk response (i.e., the reduction in propensity to select the risky project) to adding 
dynamic incentives is significant for the high and medium risk averse types, but not for 
low risk averse types. Throughout this paper, we explore this relationship between static 
risk aversion and dynamic risk responses in experimental settings in greater detail.  
Outside of developing country contexts, many more experiments have incorporated 
dynamic incentives. These include public goods experiments with repeated rounds that can 
create dynamic incentives to build reputation over rounds, natural experiments that involve 
inherently dynamic choices (Andersen et al. 2006) and experiments aimed at testing choice 
behavior with asset integration and the formation of natural reference points (Andersen, 
Harrison and Rutström 2006). One recent dynamic experiment conducted among US 
undergraduates in lab settings assesses the impact of voting and communication on growth 
in experimental economies that are subject to poverty traps (Capra et al. forthcoming). 
 7
Although topically related to the experiments we describe below, this experiment has quite 
a different objective, is far more stylized and is not conducted in a field setting.  
 
III MOROCCO: DROUGHT RISK & DYNAMIC THRESHOLDS 
Droughts evoke a double response from the rural poor engaged in rainfed agro-pastoralism 
(see Elbers, Gunning and Kinsey 2007). First, drought events directly impact these 
households and often force them to modify their livelihood strategies as a matter of 
survival. Second, the anticipation of drought can dramatically shape the livelihood 
strategies a household chooses. These responses have important welfare implications for 
poor and vulnerable households.  
Morocco has become especially drought prone in the last 30 years. In the late 
1990s, the World Bank launched a rigorous effort to create a rainfall index insurance 
product in Morocco, but this project stalled just before the insurance product was to be 
marketed in part because the recent downward trend in rainfall hinted at a troubling non-
stationarity in precipitation data. While other insurance interventions to improve drought 
risk management are still on the table, agricultural research and development in drought 
tolerance as a cereal trait remains a priority.  
 
A. Experiment Design 
As part of a multi-year project aimed at characterizing drought risk in Morocco and better 
understanding household drought coping strategies, we conducted a framed field 
experiment2 with rainfed cereal farmers in the Meknes region. The goal of these 
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experiments was to assess farmers’ valuation of drought tolerance as a seed trait. In these 
experiments, farmers were offered three distinct payoff distributions – each representing a 
crop return distribution associated with a “seed.” The payoff distributions presented 
payoffs as a function of “rainfall.” A “rainfall” chip was drawn at the end of each round to 
determine the crop return for that round. These distributions include a baseline “seed” A, a 
drought tolerant “seed” B that was less sensitive to low rainfall, and a risky, high return 
“seed” C that was much more responsive to the rainfall draw (see Figure 1).  
After building comprehension through practice rounds, we elicited farmers’ 
valuation of these “seeds” in isolation using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) 
mechanism. Next, we offered these farmers all three experimental “seeds” and asked them 
to choose between them. Then, in the final segment of the experiment – the focus of the 
current paper – we continued to offer them a choice among the three experimental “seeds” 
but linked repeated rounds via cumulative earnings and introduced two discrete dynamic 
thresholds. In this dynamic experiment, farmers started with one plot, but they could lose 
this plot if their cumulative earnings dropped below the first threshold, set at cumulative 
earnings less than or equal to zero (i.e., bankruptcy). They would acquire a second plot if 
their cumulative earnings surpassed 140 Dirhams (Dh). We conducted three sets of seven 
dynamically-linked rounds in order to allow for learning.  
 
B. Effects of Dynamic Design  
Our experimental design allows us to use farmers’ static seed valuation and choices as 
control variables and thereby isolate the behavioral response introduced by the dynamic 
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thresholds. Specifically, we use two measures of static risk aversion that do not require the 
specification of a utility function. First, we use individuals’ WTP for the stand alone 
gambles in the static round to compute their implied risk premium averaged over the three 
gambles:  3 1i j ij jjRP EV WTP EV  . Second, we use individuals’ dichotomous choices 
between the three gambles to compute their average choice. This is another indicator of 
risk aversion since gamble C is riskier than A, which is riskier than B. We use this same 
natural ordering as the basis of an ordered probit model to estimate the behavioral response 
to the dynamic thresholds in the set of dynamic rounds. In addition to these risk aversion 
measures, we use a household wealth index as a time invariant subject trait and subjects’ 
earnings in the previous round as a time variant control variable.3 To estimate the effect of 
the dynamic thresholds, we measure individuals’ proximity to the 0Dh cumulative earnings 
threshold (bankruptcy and loss of first plot for one round) from above and the 140Dh 
cumulative earnings threshold (acquisition of second plot) from both below and above. 
Figure 2 depicts these proximity functions. In the full specification, we include these 
proximity measures alone and interacted with RP and with an index of household wealth in 
order to allow behavioral responses to these dynamic thresholds to be conditional on risk 
preferences and wealth.  
Table 1 contains the estimation results of six ordered probit models. These six 
specifications differ by whether interaction terms are included, whether the estimation 
includes subject random effects, and whether the full or restricted sample is used. The 
restricted sample in models 5 and 6 excludes rounds for which cumulative earnings carried 
over from the prior round were miscalculated or the dynamic thresholds were mistakenly 
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applied. As apparent from the number of observations, very few rounds are excluded by 
this criteria (<1%), but this serves as a robustness check nonetheless.  
Consider models 1 and 2 in Table 1. Since the gamble choices used as dependent 
variables are ordered from low relative risk (seed B) to high relative risk (seed C), a 
positive coefficient indicates a higher probability of choosing a risky gamble. Thus, the 
estimated coefficients on the stand alone proximity measures suggest that subjects tend to 
react most to the looming bankruptcy threshold at 0Dh. The quadratic shape of this 
relationship implies that once a subject’s cumulative earnings slip below 40Dh, he starts 
shifting to less risky gambles. Approaching the 140Dh threshold from below causes 
subjects to shift toward riskier gambles, presumably in the hopes of clearing the threshold 
and acquiring a second plot. This is consistent with the dynamic risk response described by 
Lybbert and Barrett (forthcoming). 
The plot 1 and 2 dummies – which indicate the main plot and second plot, 
respectively, in rounds when a farmer has two plots – indicate that farmers opt 
predominantly for the risky gamble on the second plot and that proximity to the 140Dh 
threshold does not shape this response. The coefficient on Plot 1 of 2, which is 1 for the 
farmer’s first plot only if he had a second that round, suggests that the mere presence of a 
second plot does not affect the seed choice for the first plot. The estimated coefficients on 
the other control variables suggest that relatively wealthier farmers tend to choose less 
risky gambles and risk aversion measured by the average (static) risk premium has no 
statistically significant effect on seed choice. The average static seed choice, however, is 
highly significant. Seed choice in the static rounds is indeed a good predictor of seed 
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choice in the dynamic rounds. Our interest is not in this coefficient per se, but in these 
static risk aversion measures as control variables. Coefficients on the interaction variables 
– conditioned on these static measures – provide the key results related to the behavioral 
effect of the dynamic thresholds of the experiment. 
The average risk premium significantly affects seed choice when interacted with 
the below 140Dh proximity measure. Farmers that are more statically risk averse are much 
more likely to shift to the risky gamble as they close in on this threshold. Whereas Gine et 
al. (2009) – who did not include a gain threshold in their design – find that static risk 
aversion is positively correlated with a cautious dynamic risk response just above a loss 
threshold (cutting access to future credit), we find that static risk aversion is positively 
correlated with risk seeking behavior just below a gain threshold. Like Gine et al. (2009), 
we find evidence of a cautious dynamic risk response just above a loss threshold, but this 
response is unconditioned on static risk aversion. Turning to the coefficients on wealth 
interactions, relatively wealthy farmers appear more likely to take additional risk when 
they are just below the gain threshold. In general, farmers seem to be less responsive to 
this threshold once they are above it, although there is some evidence that poorer farmers 
shift toward safer seed gambles just above this gain threshold.  
 
IV PERU: AREA YIELD INDEX INSURANCE  
Whereas the Moroccan experiment elicited farmers’ valuation of drought risk and drought 
tolerance in general, the experiments in Kenya and Peru were built around specific 
insurance products that had already been designed. Soon after these experiments were 
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conducted, these index insurance products were released to pastoralists and farmers, 
including subjects from the experiments. The experiments in Kenya and Peru aimed not 
only to understand subjects’ valuation of risk and insurance but to build their 
comprehension of a specific insurance product, including the concept of basis risk. These 
experiments were therefore calibrated to accurately reflect features of the underlying index 
insurance product.  
The Peruvian experiment was motivated by an area yield index insurance product, 
which aims to reduce the costs of uninsured risk for low-wealth agricultural. Risk makes 
people poor when it leads them to shy away from higher-return but riskier activities. Risk 
keeps people poor when it leads them to pursue defensive savings strategies that cut off 
pathways from poverty that they could traverse via sustained accumulation of productive 
assets. Risk impedes the development of agricultural finance markets in a region that can 
be important to the growth and development of the small-farm sector.  
While insurance is a potential solution to these problems of pervasive and costly 
risk, it is widely absent in low-income rural areas. Furthermore, only if potential buyers 
understand its main properties, can insurance remedy these risk impediments. Motivated 
by this premise, we designed and conducted a framed field experiment in the Pisco valley 
of southern Peru to build the familiarity with insurance that is required to sustain an 
insurance market. This experiment was calibrated to reflect an area yield insurance product 
that was designed as part of the broader research project. It was designed to assess the 
impact of insurance on credit uptake and reproduced the dynamic incentives underlying 
insurance and loan contracts. We conducted experiments with a random sample of about 
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400 small-scale cotton producers, who have limited formal education (6 years on average), 
extensive farming experience (24 out the 55 years of the typical farmer), and existing 
access to working capital loans (60% with access).  
 
A. Experiment Design 
Crop yield insurance is designed to help farmers smooth rough spots. Payments received in 
bad years substitute for lost income, allowing individuals to smooth their consumption 
over time. In many situations, insurance offers a second important advantage. Uninsured 
farmers who borrow to pursue a commercial strategy risk losing their land if a drought or 
another weather-related negative shock leaves them unable to repay a loan backed up by 
their land. Empirical work carried out in rural Peru reveals that about 20% of small farmers 
may refuse to take out loans precisely because they fear losing the assets on which their 
future livelihood depends (Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger 2008). In this context, 
insurance can allow rural producers to preserve their asset base. The experimental design 
challenge we faced was capturing and conveying this nuanced insurance benefit in a way 
that is transparent and accessible to farmers with limited literacy.  
The experiment in Peru involved two sets of rounds. First, in a baseline set subjects 
chose between (1) a low risk but low return self-financed project and (2) a high risk and 
high return project financed with an uninsured loan that used subjects’ land as collateral.4 
Second, in a treatment set of rounds subjects chose between these two options plus (3) a 
high risk and high return project financed with an insured loan. Throughout the 
experiment, the yield on each project depended linearly on individual and covariate shocks. 
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The covariate shock determined the average yield in a valley, and the individual shock, 
which we called “luck,” captured individual-specific factors that added to or subtracted 
from the average valley yield to produce an individual’s actual yield. The distributions of 
both covariate and individual shocks were estimated using yield data from the Pisco valley. 
We discretized these shocks to create five covariate shocks (very low, low, normal, high, 
and very high average valley yield) and three individual “luck” shocks (good, normal, and 
bad) with normal representing the center of the respective densities. In addition to earnings 
from the random yield on projects, subjects earned money based on the value of their land 
at the conclusion of each set of rounds. Dynamic incentives were introduced in this 
experiment via the possibility of defaulting on the loan, which reduced both access to 
credit and the value of land (collateral) in future rounds. 
In baseline rounds, subjects chose between projects 1 and 2 and then learned the 
average yield prevailing in their valley and their individual luck for that round. The 
randomizing devices used to simulate the realizations of these discretized shocks were 
poker chips (valley yield) and ping-pong balls (individual luck). In each round, 
representing a single farming season, one participant from each valley drew a poker chip 
from the “valley sack” containing ten colored chips: 1 green (very high), 2 blue, 4 white, 2 
red and 1 black (very low). Each subject then individually drew a colored ball from the 
“luck sack” that contained 1 yellow ball (very good luck), 2 white (normal), and 1 purple 
(bad luck). Payoffs to the uninsured loan project (2) were negative under some realizations 
of those shocks, thus making impossible to repay the loan and forcing an individual into 
default. Once in default, individuals lost access to future credit (i.e., they were stuck with 
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the self-financed project 1) and saw their land – used as collateral – depreciate in value. 
This default effect on earnings makes this experiment dynamic.  
In insurance treatment rounds, subjects were offered a third project in addition to 
projects 1 and 2. Project 3 involved simultaneously taking a loan and buying area-based 
yield (ABY) insurance. This ABY insurance contract was designed so that indemnity 
payouts occurred when either a low (red chip) or very low (black chip) covariate shock 
was drawn. With this insured loan, subjects could reduce the likelihood of default in 
rounds with an average valley yield that was low or very low. Since the ABY insurance is 
triggered by the covariate shock alone, however, subjects choosing the insured loan might 
still default due to a bad individual luck draw with normal average valley yields. Indeed, 
helping farmers to understand this basis risk was a primary objective of the experiment. By 
evaluating how subjects respond to this insured loan project (i.e., comparing the baseline 
and treatment sets) we are able to assess the extent to which ABY insurance reduces the 
fear of default and thereby encourages people to take loans in order to undertake riskier but 
more profitable activities (i.e., the “de-rationing” effect). 
To enable subjects to learn the covariate and individual nature of risk in this 
experiment, as well as the implications of choosing a particular project, subjects played a 
sequence of six low stakes or learning rounds in both the baseline and treatment sets. Low 
stakes rounds were followed by a sequence of six high stakes rounds in both games, where 
subjects were paid twice as much for each payoff unit they earned. Learning how insurance 
works was further facilitated by the fact that participants experienced several rounds in 
rapid succession, each with a different covariate and individual shock.  
 16
 
B. Effects of the Dynamic Design  
Before turning to the data to assess the effect of the dynamic default feature of this 
experiment, it is worth noting that the design of these dynamic incentives involved some 
important pre-testing – precisely because they strongly affect subjects’ behavior. In our 
original design, we initially gave each player two hectares for cotton production, each with 
a land title certificate. One hectare of land was required as collateral on any loan. Any 
player unable to repay a loan therefore had to forfeit one hectare of land and its 
corresponding land title certificate. Such a player was thereafter in the precarious position 
of holding only a single hectare of land. Based on pre-testing of the experiment, farmers 
readily understood this default mechanism, but it proved to be too powerful an incentive. It 
also dramatically increased competition among participants, who enjoyed teasing fellow 
players who lost their land. While it is true that Peruvian lenders threaten to seize land in 
the event of default, such threats are rarely implemented in our area of study. Thus, in 
order to better mimic naturally-occurring dynamic incentives, default was softened so that 
defaulting individuals lost access to the credit system for future rounds and were paid a 
lower value at the end of the game for land against which a credit lien was still held.  
Table 2 summarizes the results of the baseline rounds and the insurance treatment. 
In the baseline rounds, 24% of subjects chose the self-finance project (i.e., were risk-
rationed) and 76% chose the uninsured loan project. In the insurance treatment, the 
majority of risk-rationed subjects responded to the possibility of dodging the dynamic 
default penalty by choosing the insured loan instead of the other two projects. In particular, 
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57% of those risk-rationed in the baseline chose the insured loan project, a result that 
suggests that introducing insurance may effectively increase the reach of credit markets 
through de-rationing. Overall, almost 60% of subjects chose the insured loan project in the 
insurance treatment.  
 To examine how the dynamic incentives affected project choices, we estimated a 
multinomial logit model with project choice in the insurance treatment as dependent 
variable. As control variables, we use a set of variables from within the experiment, 
including whether a subject defaulted in the low stakes rounds of the insurance treatment, 
whether the subject was risk-rationed in the baseline rounds, subject earnings in previous 
rounds, whether a “very low” covariate shock or a “bad” idiosyncratic shock were drawn 
in the final low stakes round before the high stakes round of the insurance treatment began, 
an index that indicates comprehension of the experiment, and risk indicators based on a 
Holt and Laury (2002) lottery experiment conducted at the conclusion of the insurance 
treatment.5 We also include a set of variables collected outside the experiment using 
detailed household surveys, including wealth, relative productivity, and the number of 
peers in their agricultural networks. Table 3 reports the marginal effects of these correlates 
on choosing the insured loan. A positive (negative) marginal effect indicates a higher 
(lower) probability of choosing the insured loan over either the uninsured loan or self-
financing.6  
We focus our interpretation of the results in Table 3 on models 5 and 6, which are 
qualitatively consistent with the other models. Defaulting in the low stakes rounds of the 
insurance treatment seems to make subjects less likely to choose the insured loan, although 
Comment [TJL1]:   
 
NOTE: From those defaulting in low stakes 
insurance game (a total of 40), 65% chose again the 
uninsured loan in high stakes, 25% the insured loan 
and only 10% to self-finance. 
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this effect is confounded by the fact that defaulting is only possible if subjects choose the 
uninsured loan in these rounds and that 65% of these subjects stick to the uninsured loan in 
the high stakes round. Defaulting subjects who change projects in the high stakes round 
(i.e., the other 35%) are more than twice as likely to move to the insured loan than to self-
financing. The risk rationed dummy variable (i.e., choosing the safe, self-finance project in 
the baseline rounds) does not appear to be correlated with the probability of switching to 
the insured loan project in the high stakes round. Likewise, wealth effects within the 
experiment are not statistically significant since earnings from the low stakes rounds do not 
affect project choice. In contrast, wealthier subjects (outside the experiment) are more 
likely to take the insured loan, though the magnitude of such an effect is small. 
Interestingly, a very low covariate shock in the previous round seems to increase the 
probability of choosing the insured loan (marginally significant), while a bad idiosyncratic 
shock has no statistically significant effect. Subjects who understood the experiment well 
were much more likely to choose the insured loan. Comprehension is highly correlated 
with subject education. Together these results suggest the need to build familiarity with 
insurance and other financial instruments among poor farmers who are often the target 
clientele of emerging index insurance initiatives. The marginal effects of (static) risk 
aversion on insured loan choice are significant and negative. This is driven by the fact that 
the most risk averse subjects tend to stick with self-financing, which is the least risky 
option. Among those who chose the uninsured loan in low stakes rounds and defaulted, 
however, risk aversion seems to increase take up of the insured loan.  
 
Comment [TJL2]: Need to address this in the 
logit model by adding a dummy that indicates 
whether the subject chose the uninsured loan in the 
low stakes rounds.  
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V  KENYA: INDEX-BASED LIVESTOCK INSURANCE  
The Kenyan experiment – conducted in the Marsabit District of northern Kenya – was built 
around an index-based livestock (IBL) insurance product that uses NDVI data from 
satellite imagery as the basis of the index. One of its primary objectives was to help 
participants learn how IBL insurance works and how it might benefit them in practice. 
Since potential insurance benefits are especially important in settings such as this that are 
characterized by nonlinear asset dynamics (Barrett et al. 2006; Lybbert et al. 2004), the 
experiment was designed to subjects’ comprehension of these potential dynamic benefits to 
IBL insurance. Thus, this experiment, like the Moroccan experiment, used a dynamic 
structure created by nonlinear asset dynamics that produce a poverty trap. Subjects decided 
whether or not to insure their herd in the presence of these dynamic forces and were able to 
see the impact of these decisions over repeated rounds. We conducted these experiments in 
five locations with a total of 207 pastoralists.  
 
A. Experiment Design 
Northern Kenya is characterized by bimodal rainfall, with two rainy seasons interrupted by 
two dry seasons of roughly equal length. The game was structured so that each round 
represented a rainy season - dry season pair. We played the game for ten rounds, 
equivalent to five years. Each player drew a random starting period herd size of six, eight 
or ten head of cattle. To reflect the mixed herd of small and large livestock that are 
common in this region, they were told that ten goats and sheep were the equivalent of one 
head of cattle (or one tropical livestock unit, TLU). At the opening of each round, 
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participants had to pay five 'goats or sheep' (0.5 TLU) to feed their family. As explained 
below, this simple fixed consumption requirement creates a bifurcation in expected herd 
growth that produces nonlinear herd dynamics. 
We explained that herd growth depended on two sources of luck. First was the 
idiosyncratic luck specific to each individual. Second was the covariate climate luck that 
affected everyone in the community. Each player first selected his or her idiosyncratic luck 
by drawing from a bag containing three bottle caps representing good, average and bad 
luck (+10%, 0 or -10% adjustments to the covariate herd growth, respectively). The 
distribution of covariate herd growth was set to mirror the distribution of average herd 
growth rates observed over time in the area. Participants observed a ping pong ball drawn 
by one of them from a bag, represented covariate climate luck for the community. There 
were 16 balls in the bag that together implied an expected gross growth rate of 7.5%.7 The 
fixed consumption constraint of 0.5 TLU per period, however, creates a bifurcated net 
growth rate: expected herd growth including this consumption constraint is negative up to 
a herd size of 6.6 TLU and positive above this threshold. Following the ball drawing, 
enumerators at the table went to work with calculators quickly figuring out the resulting 
herd growth and moving to the next season, which again opened with collection of the 0.5 
TLU consumption requirement. 
We played this game four times. In the first learning game, there was no 
idiosyncratic risk and each table of approximately four players had one herd to follow. 
This quickly illustrated the basic game dynamics and the meaning of the bottle caps and 
balls. After learning the game from the first set of rounds, everyone then played the game a 
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second time with their own herd with idiosyncratic risk, but no insurance. The third game 
recreated the idiosyncratic and covariate shocks from game two and introduced index 
insurance based on remotely sensed data on forage conditions worked. We explained 
climate as a function of rainfall and forage conditions and explained that these forage 
conditions were observed and reported by satellites. When satellites were explained as 
“those moving stars you see at night”, all participants promptly understood. In this game, 
in order to buy insurance against covariate shocks, a player had to sell goats in order to pay 
the round-specific insurance premium of 1% of insured asset value (for example, 0.01 TLU 
insures 1 TLU) with a 10% strike rate, meaning that the insurance only covered losses in 
excess of 10%. Insurance payout in the event of -20% covariate growth rate drought thus 
returned a payment of (20%-10%)TLU insured = 0.1 TLU for each TLU insured, while a 
-30% drought returned twice as much.  
After comparing the results 'with' and 'without' insurance with the players, we 
played a final set of rounds in which they decided how much to insure, from zero to their 
full herd size. They were informed they would receive cash payouts based on their 
performance in this round of the game based on a randomly selected binding round in the 
game. After conducting these final rounds, we ended with a debriefing in which we 
discussed the results and how this game related to the actual IBL insurance product that 
would soon be available for purchase. We then concluded the experiment and paid subjects 
their earnings.  
 
B. Effects of the Dynamic Design  
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The main benefit of the dynamic specification of the game is that it allowed herd sizes to 
change over time, which is a major factor in the lives of the people in this area. As an 
extension of this benefit, the fixed per-period consumption constraint allowed this change 
over time to capture nonlinear herd dynamics that seemed well understood by participants 
– how hard it is to avoid becoming stockless once herd size falls below a critical threshold 
of about 7 TLU. During the game play, when herds began to diminish people would joke 
with each other about climbing the trucks to head to Nairobi and seeking alternative 
employment. Overall, subjects readily understood the dynamic structure of the experiment 
because it paralleled the reality they face.  
This dynamic structure allowed subjects to experience asset-dependent growth 
prospects in a familiar way. They sometimes expressed frustration at having to meet the 
subsistence requirement; one player jokingly pleaded that he would go hungry and only 
sell enough animals to buy food for the children so he could get by with selling on three 
goats instead of five. This request indicates how well they related to the dynamic forces in 
the experiment and highlights a critical survival strategy that is all too familiar to them: 
state contingent consumption. While we did not attempt to formally involve state variables 
or stochastic shocks in determining consumption flows in the experiment, which were 
fixed each season at the subsistence 0.5 TLU level, the sense that the size of the household 
herd could influence consumption in this population – whose diet is disproportionately 
milk – is also important. Pastoralists do face the choice of reducing consumption now in 
order to “asset smooth” and thereby decrease the chances of facing eventual total asset 
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loss, a behavior observed among this population (Barrett et al. 2006) that can undermine 
human capital through malnutrition (e.g., Hoddinott 2006).  
 Including this well-understood specification of herd dynamics allowed us to 
characterize the intertemporal impacts of asset risks and so to emphasize the intertemporal 
value of IBL insurance in this pastoral setting. This helped further stimulate players to 
consider intertemporal costs and benefits when making insurance purchase decisions. 
Moreover, the bifurcation herd dynamics in the game implicitly suggested different 
potential of IBL insurance in altering herd and welfare dynamics conditional on a player’s 
initial herd size. IBL insurance may be more valuable if it protects those vulnerable 
households with a herd size around the critical threshold from falling onto the negative 
herd growth path due to catastrophic covariate shock. 
 The sequential structure of the experiment enabled subjects to process the costs and 
benefits of IBL insurance by providing a direct comparison of the evolution of herd size 
with and without insurance. The first few columns of Table 4 summarize the comparison 
between ‘with insurance’ and ‘without insurance,’ which is driven by the structure and 
calibration of the experiment. These results allowed us to demonstrate to participants that 
the main benefit of IBL insurance was that it reduced variability in herd size over time – 
particularly for relatively small herds near dynamic thresholds. From other research we 
have conducted in this area, we know that 63% of total income is from livestock and 
livestock products, the largest component (44%) being milk. This allowed us to stress the 
point that insurance that reduces variability in herd size over time enables herders to 
dramatically stabilize consumption over time. The final columns in Table 4 compare the 
Comment [TJL3]: Add refs? 
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mean share of the herd insured by subjects with different starting herd sizes. Based on this 
summary statistic, those with smaller starting herds – those at greater risk of falling below 
the critical 6.6 TLU threshold – insure more of their herd.  
More detailed analysis of insurance decisions across these final rounds reveals 
additional insights. Over the course of the last game played consisting of ten rounds, 49% 
of subjects insured half or more of their herds with 12% insuring the full value of their 
herds in all ten rounds. To better understand insurance decisions made in each round, we 
estimate a tobit model with the fraction of the herd insured in a given round as the 
dependent variable (double-censored at 0% and 100% herd insured). We regressed this 
value on the number of the round, site dummies, starting herd size dummies, current round 
herd size, and the outcomes of the shock variables in the previous round. These results are 
shown in Table 5.  
The dynamic nature of the game is reflected in these results in a variety of ways. 
First, the share of the herd insured increases as more rounds were played. Second, the 
dynamic structure of the experiment allow a nuanced understanding of the wealth 
dependent effects. On one hand, the coefficients for the initial herd size dummies illustrate 
that the higher the starting period herd size, the higher the share of the herd insured in 
subsequent rounds of the game. On the other hand, the beginning round herd size results 
indicate that the share of the herd insured is a decreasing function of herd size. This helps 
to explain the summary statistics in Table 4: Subjects starting with 6 TLU insure a greater 
share of their herd on average not because of their starting point, but because they tend to 
have smaller herds across all rounds and share insured is inversely related to herd size. 
 25
Finally, subjects tend to insure more of their herd immediately after experiencing a 
negative shock. While this makes sense in general since the value of insurance is always 
clearer after getting hit with a bad shock, this response appears slightly stronger for the 
idiosyncratic shock even though the insurance only covered the covariate shock. In 
ongoing analysis, we will explore this effect further by linking the observed game play 
with a parallel contingent valuation study of individuals’ willingness to pay for insurance 
and underlying risk preferences. 
 
VI DISCUSSION 
Table 6 summarizes the three field experiments we have discussed. Although these 
experiments have different objectives and designs, they share in common the use of 
repeated seasons to enable subjects to appreciate stochastic and dynamic benefits. They 
also share the objective of assessing subjects’ valuation of risk reduction once they have 
learned about the nature of these benefits. The dynamic element of each experiment is 
quite distinct: whereas the Moroccan and Kenyan experiments explicitly incorporate asset 
dynamics (land and livestock, respectively), the Peruvian experiment introduces these 
dynamics implicitly via the default penalty. Obviously, standard experimental design 
tradeoffs apply so that incorporating the dynamic element required fewer other elements in 
the experiment. In the case of the Kenyan experiment, for example, incorporating herd 
dynamics made it difficult to include other choice variables. In making these tradeoffs in 
this case, we placed greater emphasis on illustrating how livestock insurance worked and 
how it could benefit pastoralists than on using the experiment to predict their livestock 
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management and insurance uptake behavior in naturally occurring settings. In all three 
experiments, subjects’ risk decisions respond to these dynamic elements. Some of these 
responses suggest interesting and subtle connections between static risk aversion and 
dynamic risk responses; others suggest that the evolution of a subject’s asset holdings may 
shape their decision making with respect to risk. We view these dynamically-induced 
behavioral wrinkles as suggestive what might be learned from experiments with carefully 
calibrated wealth or asset dynamics. Although standard limitations of experimental 
economics apply, this type of dynamic experiment seems promising as a means of refining 
our understanding of risk responses in setting with important underlying dynamics. 
 Subject comprehension is an omnipresent concern when designing and 
administering field experiments – particularly among poor subjects with limited formal 
education and literacy. There are obvious tradeoffs that must be addressed when 
considering dynamic experiments, which often complicate the experimental design. While 
comprehension issues certainly loom large, one can frequently leverage the familiar 
context of framed field experiments to build comprehension of the dynamic design among 
other things and avoid some subject confusion. In the case of the two index insurance 
experiments we describe, the connection between an actual insurance product and a 
specific context seems to improve subjects’ comprehension of the experiment, as well as 
their appreciation for the dynamic elements of these experiments. In ongoing analyses and 
data collection, we aim to test whether these comprehension benefits spillover into uptake 
of the actual insurance product – which will provide an interesting external validity test. 
Anecdotally, we have some basis for believing these spillovers will exist: after 
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participating in the Kenyan experiment, several herders repeatedly contacted our local 
collaborators to ask when the NDVI index based livestock insurance would be available to 
them. 
 While the advantages of using context to improve comprehension are real, so too 
are the comprehension problems that can remain. In all three experiments, building 
subjects’ comprehension of the structure of the experiment took time. The dynamic 
elements of these experiments added to this time investment not only because of the added 
complexity, but more importantly because many repeated rounds are required for subjects 
to experience these dynamic forces and perceive long run patterns. To be more specific, we 
faced several difficulties when explaining the Peruvian insurance experiment to 
participants, including the notion of average valley yield and the concept of index 
insurance that did not protect individual shocks. Finally, since conducting a dynamic 
experiment often demands several calculation each round for multiple subjects under time 
pressure, computational mistakes among enumerators can be a serious issue. In current 
research, we are therefore using a computer-based platform for conducting field 
experiments in these settings to reduce calculation time and human errors. 
 We conclude with a few observations about the external validity of the dynamic 
elements in our experiments. Here there are important differences between the Moroccan 
experiment and those in Kenya and Peru. In Morocco, the experiment – including the land 
accumulation dynamic – is not intended to have a direct naturally occurring analogue. 
Instead, its within-subject design is meant to enable the comparison of stylized decision 
making under risk in static and dynamic environments. In Kenya and Peru, however, the 
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dynamic elements were intended to have some connection to naturally occurring 
analogues. Largely as a result of subjects’ familiarity with these analogues, participants 
seemed to quickly catch on to this connection. While there is some hope for a degree of 
external validity of dynamic experiments, using experiments to mimic underlying poverty 
dynamics in order to directly inform policy design may be impossible. For more modest 
objectives, however, dynamic experiments may be a promising tool both for researchers 
seeking to understand the behavior of the poor and for the poor seeking to understand 
complex products such as index insurance. 
 
                                                 
1 Interested readers are referred to working papers – available upon request – for these details. The full 
protocols used to administer the experiments are also available from the authors upon request.  
2 Framed field experiments are framed using a specific context and conducted with subjects who are familiar 
with this context (Harrison and List 2004).  
3 In multiple round experiments, subjects are often sensitive to previous round experiences. While these intra-
experiment dynamics are not our focus, it is nevertheless necessary to control for them in order to avoid 
omitted variable bias.  
4 In these experiments, subjects were endowed with a hectare of land at the beginning of the experiment. 
Those in default had their land depreciated. 
5 We assumed Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences under Expected Utility to estimate these 
risk aversion coefficients as the curvature parameter, which we further assumed to be a function of age, 
education, and gender. On average, subjects exhibit moderate risk aversion—the estimated CRRA coefficient 
is 0.45 (see Galarza 2009 for details). 
6 Note that similar marginal effects exist for both the choice of the self-finance project and the choice of the 
uninsured loan project with respect to the two remaining options, respectively. We focus on the insured loan 
choice and therefore do not report these alterative marginal effects.  
7 There were five +20%growth rate balls representing a very good year. There were seven +10% growth rate 
balls reflecting a good year. Two balls were zero growth balls, reflecting a bad year, but not a drought. Then 
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Figure 2 Proximity functions used to measure distance from dynamic loss (dashed) and gain 
(solid) thresholds at 0 Dh and 140 Dh of cumulative earnings. 
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Table 1 Ordered Probit results for “seed” choice as function of distance from dynamic thresholds 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Proximity[+]0 0.0090** 0.014*** 0.0087** 0.014*** 0.0067 0.013*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0059) 
Proximity[+]02 -0.00011* -0.00020*** -0.000096* -0.00018*** -0.000066 -0.00017*** 
 (0.000065) (0.000071) (0.000065) (0.000072) (0.000069) (0.000076) 
Proximity[-]140 0.014*** 0.014** 0.0049 0.0029 0.0053 0.0038 
 (0.0073) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0080) (0.0087) 
Proximity[-]1402 -0.00013 -0.00017 6.6e-06 -0.000014 6.1e-06 -0.000034 
 (0.00012) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00015) 
Proximity[+]140 -0.011 -0.0071 -0.012 -0.0078 -0.014 -0.0084 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Proximity[+]1402 0.00023 0.00015 0.00020 0.00011 0.00019 0.000082 
 (0.00021) (0.00022) (0.00021) (0.00022) (0.00022) (0.00023) 
Plot 1 of 2 {0,1} 0.15 -0.041 0.15 -0.047 0.26** 0.039 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) 
Plot 2 of 2 {0,1} 0.50*** 0.31** 0.50*** 0.30** 0.46*** 0.21 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
Plot 2 x Prox[+]140 0.018 0.021 0.018 0.021 0.022 0.025 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Plot 2 x Prox[+]1402 -0.00037 -0.00040 -0.00037 -0.00041 -0.00038 -0.00042 
 (0.00029) (0.00030) (0.00029) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00030) 
RP x Prox[+]0  -0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0014 
  (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0050) 
RP x Prox[+]02  -0.00014 -0.00013 -0.00013 -0.00013 
  (0.00011) (0.00014) (0.00011) (0.00014) 
RP x Prox[-]140  0.028*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
RP x Prox[-]1402  0.0028*** 0.0033*** 0.0028*** 0.0033*** 
  (0.00083) (0.00094) (0.00083) (0.00095) 
RP x Prox[+]140  -0.0077 -0.0031 -0.0054 -0.00061 
  (0.0072) (0.0081) (0.0073) (0.0081) 
RP x Prox[+]1402  0.00024 0.00019 0.00031 0.00026 
  (0.00030) (0.00034) (0.00030) (0.00035) 
Wealth x Prox[+]0  0.000061 -0.00022 0.00018 -0.00013 
  (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Wealth x Prox[+]02  9.8e-07 -3.3e-06 -3.4e-07 -5.6e-06 
  (7.2e-06) (9.5e-06) (7.5e-06) (9.9e-06) 
Wealth x Prox[-]140  0.0040 0.0045* 0.0043* 0.0046* 
  (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0031) 
Wealth x Prox[-]1402  -0.000039 -0.000041 -0.000043 -0.000041 
  (0.000036) (0.000040) (0.000037) (0.000041) 
Wealth x Prox[+]140  0.0024 0.0022 0.0025 0.0022 
  (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0021) 
Wealth x Prox[+]1402  0.000038** 0.000041* 0.000041** 0.000044** 
  (0.000022) (0.000026) (0.000022) (0.000026) 
Previous Round 
Earnings 
0.00019 -0.00063 0.000097 -0.00070 -0.000100 -0.00083 
(0.00058) (0.00062) (0.00058) (0.00062) (0.00060) (0.00063) 
Wealth Index -0.055** -0.085** -0.092* -0.11 -0.11** -0.13* 
 (0.028) (0.051) (0.059) (0.077) (0.060) (0.078) 
Average Risk 
Premium 
-0.051 -0.030 0.060 -0.0051 0.015 -0.040 
(0.11) (0.19) (0.22) (0.28) (0.22) (0.28) 
Average Static 
“Seed” Choice  
0.41*** 0.52*** 0.41*** 0.53*** 0.41*** 0.53*** 
(0.044) (0.082) (0.045) (0.082) (0.045) (0.083) 
Random Effects: No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Excluding Errors: No No No No Yes Yes 
N: 2236 2236 2236 2236 2198 2198 
*** (**) [*] denote significance at 5% (10%) [15%] levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3 Marginal effects from multinomial logit model for insured loan project choice over 
either self-finance or uninsured loan projects 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Defaulted in low stakes 
insurance treatment {0,1}  
-0.498*** -0.387** -0.545*** -0.513*** -0.634*** -0.635*** 
(0.109) (0.167) (0.100) (0.168) (0.098) (0.228) 
Risk rationed in baseline {0,1}  0.021 -0.027 0.061 0.025 -0.037 -0.011 
 (0.069) (0.032) (0.074) (0.045) (0.154) (0.072) 
Earnings in low stakes 
insurance treatment 
-0.041 -0.0004 -0.022 -0.009 -0.032 -0.005 
(0.051) (0.021) (0.051) (0.032) (0.052) (0.026) 
“Very low” covariate shock in 
previous round {0,1}2 
0.071 0.023 0.134 0.075 0.142 0.060 
(0.134) (0.054) (0.121) (0.063) (0.114) (0.049) 
“Bad” idiosyncratic shock in 
previous round {0,1}3 
-0.009 -0.007 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.013 
(0.055) (0.010) (0.064) (0.039) (0.066) (0.032) 
Comprehension index 4 0.331*** 0.151*** 0.291* 0.181* 0.299* 0.155* 
 (0.152) (0.068) (0.158) (0.104) (0.159) (0.084) 
Risk aversion  -0.236** -0.148* -0.323** -0.153** 
  (0.123) (0.077) (0.155) (0.077) 
Risk aversion x Risk rationed  0.274 0.079 
  (0.294) (0.135) 
Risk x Defaulted   0.503* 0.227 
    (0.342) (0.184) 
Household wealth (1000 Soles) 0.004** 0.002** 0.004** 0.002* 0.004** 0.002* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of peers in  
agricultural network 5 
-0.021 -0.008 -0.025 -0.015 -0.025 -0.011 
(0.021) (0.010) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023) (0.012) 
High relative productivity {0,1}6 0.076 0.040 0.051 0.028 0.054 0.027 
   (0.061) (0.029) (0.066) (0.042) (0.066) (0.034) 
Region Fixed Effects: No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo-R2: 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.19 
N: 362 362 350 350 350 350
1 Defaulting means having chosen the uninsured loan and that a very low covariate shock (i.e., a black chip) was 
drawn in that round.  
2 This dummy variable indicates that a black chip was drawn in the subject’s valley in the last low stakes round 
(immediately before the high stakes) in the insurance treatment. 
3 This dummy variable indicates that a purple ball was drawn by the subject in the last low stakes round 
(immediately before the high stakes) in the insurance treatment. 
4 Financial literacy measures the degree of comprehension of the insurance game (insured and uninsured loans), 
and ranges from 0 (did not understood at all) to 1 (fully understood). 
5 An agricultural network is composed of a set of farmers who interchange information about farming activities. 
6 This variable indicates that a subject obtained higher cotton yields than the valley average yield. . 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** (**) [*] denote significance at 5% (10%) [15%] levels.  




Comment [TJL4]: From your NOTE above, it 
sounds like you need to add another dummy that 
indicates whether they chose the uninsured loan in 
the low stakes insurance treatment.  
You may be right. I tried to include only the 
cumulated number of the black chips before the high 
stakes insurance treatment and the sign was positive. 
I will explore this further in the next days. For now, I 
will leave it as it is. 
 
 
The problem now is that two things are tangled in 
this variable: choice of uninsured loan in the 
insurance treatment AND default conditional on this 
choice.  
 
Once you separate them out, I think we’ll see default 
having the expected effect of pushing people towards 
the insured loan.  
 
Comment [TJL5]: Why dummy variables instead 
the shock itself?  
Comment [TJL6]: Is comprehension measured in 
a way that explains this relationship? Is this effect an 
artifact of the way comprehension is measured? (i.e., 
you had to choose the insured loan at some point to 
really understand how it works???)
Comment [TJL7]: This suffers from the same 
compound as above…so it captures two things: 
choice of uninsured loan and default. 
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Table 4 Contrasting outcomes with and without insurance in Kenya 
 Mean herd size 
‘with’ greater 
than ‘without’ 
Mean variance in herd 
size across rounds ‘with’ 
compared to ‘without’ 
Mean share of 
herd insured 
across rounds 
t-statistic on test of 
different means* 
6 – X 8 - 10 
6 TLU start +3% -40% 81% - - 
8 TLU start +2% -29% 78% 2.40 - 
10 TLU start +3% -22% 68% 8.47 6.45 




Table 5 Tobit estimation results for fraction of herd insured in Kenya 
 Coefficients Std Errors 
Round number (2,3,…,10) 0.012*** 0.0046
Dirib Gumbo dummy  0.11*** 0.0378
Karare dummy 0.13*** 0.0346
Kargi dummy 0.14*** 0.0354
North Horr dummy       0.09** 0.0365
Start 6 TLU dummy 1.25*** 0.0771
Start 8 TLU dummy 1.38*** 0.0938
Start 10 TLU dummy 1.39*** 0.1022
Beginning round herd size  -0.0910*** 0.0139
Beginning round herd size2  0.0020*** 0.0005
Covariate shock previous round  -0.0013* 0.0009
Idiosyncratic shock previous round    -0.0028** 0.0015
R2: 0.47
N (207 subjects x 9 rounds each): 1863
Logologo is omitted site dummy. All three start sizes included instead of an overall constant. Estimated as double 
censored tobit model (45% (2%) of observations censored at 100% (0%) of herd insured). Subject fixed effects are 
not included so that start sizes can be.  
*** (**) [*] denote significance at 5% (10%) [15%] levels.  
 
Comment [TJL8]: Compute marginal effects? 
Comment [TJL9]: It might be nice to include 
(perhaps in a separate specification) a variable that 
captures proximity to the 6.6 threshold….(something 
like in figure 2?) 
 
Comment [TJL10]: The comparison of these two 
shock coefficients is tricky because the covariate 
shock has five categories while the idio shock only 
has three. Marginal effects might help sort out 
whether the magnitude of the effect is comparable or 
not. Statistically the effect is only slightly stronger 
for the idio shock. 
Comment [TJL11]: Probably not worth double 
censored model…a single censor at 100% is 
probably sufficient. 
Comment [TJL12]: In the next round, we may 
want to estimate this model with HH fixed effects 
(and drop start dummies) as well. 
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Table 6 Summary of the three experiments, their dynamic element and the effect of this feature 
 Morocco Peru Kenya 
Research 
objectives 
 Characterize drought risk and 
vulnerability among rainfed 
cereal farmers.  
 Understand their likely 
valuation of drought 
tolerance and no-till 
techniques that reduce risk. 
 Design and introduce an area 
yield insurance product.  
 Evaluate its potential benefits 
to cotton farmers and assess 
their valuation and likely 
uptake of the product.     
 Design and introduce an 
NDVI index based livestock 
insurance product.  
 Evaluate its potential benefits 
to pastoralists and assess 
their valuation and likely 
uptake of the product.     
Experiment 
objective 
Assess valuation of risk 
reduction. 
 Build subjects’ 
comprehension of index 
insurance product to insure 
covariate risk. 
 Assess demand for insurance 
product and its impact on 
credit uptake.  
 Build subjects’ 
comprehension of index 
insurance product to insure 
covariate risk with nonlinear 
herd dynamics. 




Framed field experiment* in 
which subjects separately 
value three different gambles 
(‘seeds’) with payoffs 
determined by a random draw 
(‘rainfall’), then choose 
between the three ‘seeds’.   
Framed field experiment in 
which subjects chose between 
undertaking a project with 
covariate and idiosyncratic 
risk via self-financing or an 
uninsured loan. Insured loan 
then added as a third option.  
Framed field experiment in 
which subjects experience 
covariate and idiosyncratic 
risk with and without 
insurance, then choose how 




Subjects choose between the 
three ‘seeds’ for seven 
consecutive rounds with 
cumulative earnings. They 
lose their plot for one season 
(gain a second plot) if their 
cumulative earnings are below 
0Dh (above 140Dh). 
Subjects with uninsured loan 
face dynamic risk of default, 
which eliminated their access 
to credit in future rounds and 
depreciated the value of their 
land.  
 
Subjects required to consume 
0.5 livestock units each round, 
which creates positive 
(negative) expected herd 






 Farmers are conservative just 
above the 0Dh threshold and 
aggressive just below the 
140Dh.  
 Statically risk averse farmers 
are especially aggressive just 
below 140Dh. 
 Farmers take greater risks 
with the second plot once 
they have it.  
 In pre-testing, losing land as 
default consequence too 
dominant as a dynamic 
incentive.  
 57% of risk rationed farmers 
opt for insured loan when 
available. 
 Statically risk averse farmers 
tend to stick with self-
financing. 
 Herders clearly understood 
the nonlinearity introduced 
by the consumption 
requirement. 
 Mean share of herd insured 
higher for those starting 
below 6.6 threshold. 
 Share of herd insured 
increases with initial herd 
size but decreases as herds 
grow, which requires linked 
rounds.  
* This terminology is from Harrison and List (2004). 
